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Abstract
Can behavior be unconsciously primed via the activation of attitudes, stereotypes, or other concepts? A number of studies
have suggested that such priming effects can occur, and a prominent illustration is the claim that individuals’ accuracy in
answering general knowledge questions can be influenced by activating intelligence-related concepts such as professor or
soccer hooligan. In 9 experiments with 475 participants we employed the procedures used in these studies, as well as a
number of variants of those procedures, in an attempt to obtain this intelligence priming effect. None of the experiments
obtained the effect, although financial incentives did boost performance. A Bayesian analysis reveals considerable evidential
support for the null hypothesis. The results conform to the pattern typically obtained in word priming experiments in which
priming is very narrow in its generalization and unconscious (subliminal) influences, if they occur at all, are extremely short-
lived. We encourage others to explore the circumstances in which this phenomenon might be obtained.
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Introduction
In recent years a substantial body of evidence has accumulated
which suggests that behaviour can be unconsciously influenced or
primed by the activation of relevant stereotypes, attitudes, traits,
goals, or other concepts. Instead of, or in addition to, the normal
route from conscious intentions to behaviours, individuals can be
induced (it is claimed) to act socially or unsocially, walk faster or
slower, behave more or less intelligently, or perceive accurately or
inaccurately as a result of subtle priming influences of which they
are unaware. Bargh, Chen, and Burrows, for example, asked
participants in one study to read sentences containing words
related to the concept old age and reported that a few minutes later
these individuals walked more slowly down a corridor [1]. Another
study reported that participants judged a hill as steeper when they
were wearing a heavy backpack [2]. Equally striking, and the focus
of the present research, is Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg’s
report that individuals answer more general knowledge questions
correctly after being asked to think about the attributes of a
professor than they do after thinking about soccer hooligans [3].
Understanding the principles of behaviour change is funda-
mental to psychology. Consequently, demonstrations such as these
call into question the standard view that the best way to effect
behaviour change is through alterations to conscious beliefs and
intentions. Those involved in this research have made bold
statements about its importance. Bargh and Huang [4], for
instance, wrote:
‘‘Priming’’ refers to the passive, subtle, and unobtrusive
activation of relevant mental representations by external,
environmental stimuli, such that people are not and do not
become aware of the influence exerted by those stimuli. In
harmony with the situationist tradition, this priming
research has shown that the mere, passive perception of
environmental events directly triggers higher mental pro-
cesses in the absence of any involvement by conscious,
intentional processes…’’ (p. 128)
On the other hand, from the perspective of cognitive
psychology, these effects are more than a little surprising. A
well-established principle in traditional priming research (which
commonly involves presenting words as primes to study lexical or
semantic processing) is that generalization is often extremely
narrow and context-specific [5]. If the priming effects of reading a
word such as OLD do not transfer across changes in font or
modality, then how likely is it that they transfer to something like
speed of walking? The priming effects described above are unusual
in this context as they imply effects which generalize very broadly.
Another reason these reports are surprising is that decades of
research has found that unconscious or subliminal influences on
behaviour are exceptionally difficult to demonstrate [6], [7], [8],
and even when replicable positive effects are shown, they tend to
be over extremely short time intervals (less than a second), far
shorter than the intervals involved in the studies described above,
where periods of at least a few minutes are involved.
The experiments described in this article arose from an initial
desire to probe more deeply into claims that the aforementioned
goal priming effects are unconscious. Our intention was to use
more sensitive measures of awareness to investigate the extent to
which participants are truly unconscious of the influence of the
prime on their behaviour in tasks where priming a concept related
to intelligence (Professor or Soccer hooligan) has been reported to affect
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performance on a subsequent test of general knowledge. Note that
the present focus on activation of other-related stereotypes
(stereotypes of groups of which one is not a member) excludes
studies within the ‘stereotype threat’ literature in which activation
of self-related stereotypes (such as ‘African American’ for African
American participants) is found to reduce academic performance
[9]. In contrast to the studies reviewed here, stereotype threat
research tends to assume that the effects of activating a self-related
stereotype are consciously mediated and arise through raised state
anxiety [10]. Another difference is that the stereotype threat effect
is negative compared to a neutral control condition whereas
intelligence priming can be both positive and negative.
We found it difficult, however, to replicate the basic effect of
stereotype priming on accuracy in answering general knowledge
questions. Our efforts to determine the reasons for this difficulty
are described here, together with a Bayesian analysis of our
findings [11]. This provides a precise quantitative evaluation,
given a level of prior belief in the intelligence priming effect, of the
posterior odds of the null hypothesis (no priming effect) against the
experimental hypothesis (intelligence can be primed).
Experiments 1–4
Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg’s [3] task involved a
between-subjects manipulation. Some participants spent a few
minutes describing the attributes of a typical professor, whereas
others described those of a typical soccer hooligan. Specifically,
they were asked to imagine a typical professor (or soccer hooligan)
and to list the behaviors, lifestyle, and appearance attributes of this
typical professor (or soccer hooligan). Participants then performed
what was presented as an unrelated multiple-choice general
knowledge test. Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg reported that
priming the stereotypes of professor (Experiments 1 & 2) or soccer
hooligans (Experiment 3) affected performance on the general
knowledge task, with the former leading to improved performance
and the latter to worse performance. The same effect on behaviour
was shown when, instead of thinking about a typical professor or
soccer hooligan, participants were asked to think directly about the
traits intelligence or stupidity (Experiment 4). Furthermore, there
was evidence that the priming effect increased when the prime
phase was longer (9 min vs 2 min).
Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg [3] suggested that the
priming effect occurs because activation of the stereotype of
intelligence (in the professor compared to the soccer hooligan
condition) leads participants to use more intelligent strategies for
answering the questions, or motivates them to concentrate harder,
or increases confidence and hence induces a beneficial response
bias. The range of possible mechanisms is discussed elsewhere
[12], [13].
The first four experiments reported here attempted to obtain
the basic intelligence priming effect using procedures similar
(Experiments 1 and 2) or identical (Experiments 3 and 4) to those
used in the original study describing the effect.
Methods
In Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg’s [3] procedure and in a
subsequent replication by the same authors [14] participants
simply wrote down some of the attributes of a typical professor or
soccer hooligan before taking the knowledge test. In our first
experiment we introduced two modifications to this procedure.
First, we used an extended priming procedure in which
participants watched an 8 min video clip either showing professors
discussing cosmology or a documentary on soccer hooliganism,
prior to (as in Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg’s procedure),
requiring them to spend 5 min listing the attributes of a typical
professor or soccer hooligan. On the basis of Dijksterhuis and van
Knippenberg’s [3] results, extending the priming stage should
enhance its effect. Secondly, instead of answering general
knowledge questions, participants completed questions from
Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices and they did this both
before and after seeing the video. If the effects of priming are
thought to be due to changes in motivation or strategy, then
examining performance in a general knowledge test seems less
than ideal given the binary nature of such knowledge (known/
unknown). Instead, employing a test of analytical thinking and
problem solving should be better suited to detecting priming
effects. The method is therefore close to that of a study [15] which
reported an increase in performance on a test of analytical
thinking after participants listened to an audiotape of a day in the
life of a professor. Participants in that study, however, were
explicitly instructed to take the point of view of the professor, so
the nature of the priming effect was very different.
The numbers of participants in each condition in this and the
other experiments are shown in the relevant data tables. Full
details of the methods can be found in the Supporting
Information. At the end of each experiment participants’
awareness of the purpose of the experiment was assessed via a
funnel debriefing (see Supporting Information for details).
In Experiment 2 the method was the same except that we
removed the video clip. The priming procedure was therefore
identical to that employed by Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg
[3]. In Experiment 3 the priming procedure was the same as that
in Experiment 2 but extended to 9 min, the Raven’s questions
were replaced with general knowledge questions, and no questions
were presented prior to the priming phase, meaning that the
experiment was a close replication of the method used by
Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg ([3], Experiment 4), ([14],
Experiment 2), and Hansen and Wa¨nke ([16], Experiment 2).
Experiment 4 was, similarly, a close replication of the original
method but with a larger sample size than any of the published
studies. The priming phase lasted 5 min.
Results
Across the experiments reported here, some participants
reported in debriefing that the priming procedure might have
influenced their performance in the knowledge test (see Supporting
Information for details). However these reports were often vague
and inconsistent with the experimental hypothesis: for instance,
some participants in the soccer hooligan prime conditions reported
that listing attributes about the stereotype helped them to
concentrate and perform better in the general knowledge task.
None of the results in any of the experiments were altered by the
exclusion of these participants, and hence we report results across
all participants.
To investigate the change in test performance following priming
a difference score was computed for Experiments 1 and 2, by
subtracting the baseline score from the post-priming score. The
mean difference scores for both Experiments 1 and 2 are shown in
Table 1 (effect sizes are reported in Table 2) and suggest that there
was an improvement in performance in both groups, representing
a benefit of practice. However, contrary to predictions, the
improvement was no greater in the professor than in the hooligan
condition: in fact it was the other way round in both experiments,
though the mean improvement scores did not differ either in
Experiment 1, t(38) =21.10, p= .14, or in Experiment 2,
t(14) =20.18, p= .43 (because we are testing directional predic-
tions, all reported p values are 1-tailed).
Priming Intelligent Behavior
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For Experiment 3 there was no pre-test and hence the key data
are raw scores (percentages correct) on the general knowledge test.
The analysis revealed that there was no significant difference
between the two conditions, t(42) = 0.45, p= .33. Experiment 4
yielded no evidence of stereotype priming either, t(98) = 0.57,
p= .28. Note that these experiments employed sample sizes
comparable to or larger than those employed by Dijksterhuis
and van Knippenberg [3]: their groups varied in size from
approximately 10 to 32. Experiment 4 included more participants
(50 per group) than any of the published studies.
Failures to obtain significant effects (null results) are often
regarded as inconclusive in psychological research. Yet from a
Bayesian perspective there is little difference in the status of an
experimental hypothesis versus the null hypothesis, in the sense
that in both cases it is meaningful to define the probability of the
data given the hypothesis. A considerable body of recent research
has sought to develop methods for quantifying these probabilities
and, in particular, for comparing them in a likelihood ratio [11],
[17]. Specifically, a ‘‘Bayes factor’’ is defined as the ratio of the
probability of the data given the null hypothesis versus the
probability of the data given the experimental hypothesis. This
likelihood ratio, when multiplied by the prior odds, yields the
posterior likelihood ratio of the null versus the experimental
hypothesis, given the data. When this odds ratio is very small, such
as 1:10, then one can infer that the evidence strengthens the
experimental hypothesis by a factor of 10, regardless of one’s prior
belief about the likelihood of the experimental hypothesis being
true. Conversely, when the odds ratio is very large (e.g., 10:1) then
the evidence strengthens the null hypothesis by a factor of 10,
again regardless of prior beliefs. We report later a full Bayesian
analysis of our findings, but as a preview we note that the results of
Experiments 1–4 yield Bayes factors of between 2.54:1 and 5.58:1
in favour of the null (see Table 2). Thus each experiment suggests
an approximate trebling of the posterior probability of the null
hypothesis being true, compared to the experimental hypothesis.
Our subsequent analysis also includes a description of the
cumulative odds ratios based on all our experimental data.
In light of these failures to obtain intelligence priming, we
conducted a thorough literature review to identify all priming
studies published subsequent to the original reports of Dijksterhuis
and colleagues which obtained an influence of stereotype
activation on some measure of knowledge or intelligence [3],
[14], [18]. One study [16] employed the same task and procedure
as Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg [3] with the exception that
the primes were professors and cleaning ladies, while another used
professor and soccer player primes [19]. Three further reports
using modifications of the original method were also identified
[20], [21], [22]. The following experiments attempt to replicate
the findings of these latter reports. A further study [23] obtained a
nonsignificant assimilation effect (see Discussion).
Experiment 5
The basic intelligence priming obtained by Dijksterhuis and van
Knippenberg [3] is an assimilation effect in the sense that the
participant’s behavior purportedly comes to resemble that of the
prime (professors behave intelligently, soccer hooligans unintelli-
gently). More recently, it has been suggested that the behavioral
effects of abstract social concepts such as stereotypes are not
always assimilative. Instead, behavior can be shifted in the
opposite direction to the activated concept. Such behavioral
contrast, like assimilation, takes place following a priming
procedure but only in the presence of several moderating factors
assumed to trigger social comparison.
Table 1. Experimental results.
Experiment Prime N Score SD
1 Professor 20 0.4 1.8
Hooligan 20 1.0 1.6
2 Professor 8 0.3 2.9
Hooligan 8 0.5 2.6
3 Professor 22 50.4 12.1
Hooligan 22 49.0 8.0
4 Professor 50 40.5 8.7
Hooligan 50 39.6 7.0
5 Professor-similarities 25 35.6 11.4
Einstein-differences 24 34.8 11.1
6 Professor-similarities 16 40.0 16.7
Einstein-differences 16 33.8 10.9
7 Professor in-group 12 45.0 16.4
Hooligan in-group 12 42.8 19.4
Professor out-group 12 47.2 14.3
Hooligan out-group 12 46.7 18.6
8 Incentive 20 44.5 8.3
No incentive 20 38.6 10.1
Professor 20 44.4 12.6
Hooligan 20 40.1 9.5
9 Professor independent 9 53.3 30.0
No prime independent 10 40.0 24.9
Hooligan independent 11 50.9 28.8
Professor interdependent 15 40.0 22.7
No prime interdependent 12 51.7 30.1
Hooligan interdependent 9 46.7 24.5
Note: In Experiments 1 and 2 the score is the change in number of correct
answers relative to the baseline (pre-priming) test (max = 9). All other scores are
percentages correct.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0056515.t001
Table 2. Bayesian t-test analyses.
Experiment Mean difference Bayes factor
Effect size d t-value p-value Cauchy Normal
1 20.35 21.10 .14 2.54 1.90
2 20.09 20.18 .43 2.94 2.21
3 0.14 0.45 .33 4.10 3.15
4 0.11 0.57 .28 5.58 4.36
5 20.07 20.25 .40 4.57 3.53
7 in-group 0.12 0.30 .38 3.35 2.54
7 out-group 20.03 20.08 .47 3.47 2.64
8 0.38 1.20 .12 2.30 1.72
9 independent 20.08 20.18 .43 3.18 2.40
9 interdependent 20.29 20.68 .25 2.80 2.10
Note: In Experiments 7 (out-group) and 9 (independent) the predicted effect
was reversed, i.e., hooligan.professor.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0056515.t002
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An initial suggestion was that while priming the stereotype of
professors or supermodels leads to behavioral assimilation, priming
exemplars such as Albert Einstein (i.e., an intelligent exemplar) or
Claudia Schiffer (i.e., a purportedly low-intelligent exemplar) leads
to behavioural contrast, revealed as worse performance and
improved performance, respectively, in the subsequent general
knowledge test [18]. The category/exemplar contrast was
subsequently found, however, not to be the key variable. LeBoeuf
and Estes ([22], Experiment 1) tested and found support for the
alternative hypothesis that, irrespective of whether it was a
category or an exemplar, a prime could produce both behavioural
assimilation and contrast depending on how relevant a comparison
standard it was perceived to be. Comparison relevance was
manipulated by asking participants to list either similarities (high
relevance) or differences (low relevance) between themselves and
the prime, the idea being that listing self-prime similarities would
promote consideration of the prime as a relevant comparison
standard and listing self-prime differences would lead to discount-
ing the prime as a relevant comparison standard. Different groups
of participants were asked to list how similar to (high relevance) or
how different from (low relevance) either professors (category
prime) or Einstein (exemplar prime) they thought they were.
Immediately following the priming manipulation, they were asked
to answer multiple-choice general knowledge questions. The
results showed that participants in the low-relevance conditions
(where they listed differences) performed better than the partic-
ipants in the high-relevance conditions (where they listed
similarities).
LeBoeuf and Estes’ interpretation of this outcome proposed that
when participants in the low-relevance condition listed differences
between themselves and either professors or Einstein, they
activated the general trait of intelligence associated with the
primes [22]. However, because they discounted the primes as
relevant comparison standards, they demonstrated assimilation.
Participants in the high-relevance conditions, however, listed
similarities which induced them to compare themselves with
professors or Einstein, leading to worse performance, and hence,
behavioural contrast. The greatest difference was between the
groups that listed self-professor similarities and self-Einstein
differences, the latter performing substantially better than the
former. In a follow-up experiment, LeBoeuf and Estes replicated
the difference between these two groups ([22], Experiment 2). In a
further experiment (Experiment 3) they replicated Dijksterhuis et
al.’s [18] finding that performance was better after listing attributes
of a category (Professor) than of an exemplar (Einstein), while
again showing that generating self-Einstein differences led to better
performance than generating self-professor similarities.
Methods
The present experiment sought to replicate the pattern observed
by LeBoeuf and Estes and in particular focused on the two groups
that produced the biggest difference – the self-professor similarities
group and the self-Einstein differences group [22]. The experi-
ment was designed to be as close to LeBoeuf and Estes’ study as
possible (for full details see Supporting Information). The cover
story used by LeBoeuf and Estes was that the priming
manipulation and the main general-knowledge test were studies
conducted by two different departments (Marketing and Psychol-
ogy respectively). Their questionnaires, therefore, were printed on
the corresponding departments’ letterheads to strengthen the
validity of the cover story.
Results
The dependent measure was the percentage of questions
answered correctly. The results are presented in Table 1. The
difference between scores in the professor-similarities and Einstein-
differences groups was not significant, t(47) =20.25, p= .40, and
indeed was in the wrong direction. This experiment therefore
failed to replicate LeBoeuf and Estes’ [22] results where there was
a significant effect of prime type on performance in the general
knowledge test.
Experiment 6
What might explain the difference in results between LeBoeuf
and Estes’ [22] study and the previous study? We went to
considerable lengths (e.g., via the cover stories) to eliminate any
sort of demand effects. An obvious possibility is that demand
effects were responsible for the different results in the two studies.
If the participants in LeBoeuf and Estes’ study – but not in
Experiment 5 – detected the true purpose of the study and inferred
the experimental hypothesis, this might account for the different
results [24].
In Experiment 6, therefore, participants were explicitly told the
experimental hypothesis and the expected direction of the effect
the priming manipulation might have on their performance in the
general knowledge test. Specifically, participants in the Einstein-
differences condition were told that thinking about Einstein was
expected to increase their performance in the general knowledge
test whereas those in the professor-similarities condition were told
that comparing themselves to a professor was expected to decrease
their performance. If, under these conditions, it was found that
there was a significant effect of the priming manipulation on the
direction of performance, it would be safe to assume that demand
effects did indeed have a role to play in producing these results.
Results
The dependent measure used was, once again, the percentage of
correct answers in the general knowledge test. The effect of the
priming manipulation on performance (see Table 1) was once
again nonsignificantly in the wrong direction, t(30) =21.25,
p= .11, suggesting that awareness of the influence of the prime
on subsequent performance is by itself not sufficient to result in the
behavioural effects that have been reported in intelligence priming
studies.
Experiment 7
In a further elaboration of possible moderators of assimilation
and contrast, Gordijn and Stapel provided evidence that whether
social comparisons lead to automatic contrast or assimilation
effects on behaviour depends on whether the comparison target is
categorized as an in-group or out-group member [21]. Gordijn
and Stapel hypothesized that if an intergroup context is made
salient, where social identity becomes more salient than one’s
personal identity, assimilation should occur when the activated
comparison target is perceived as an in-group member. If,
however, the target is perceived as an out-group member
behavioural contrast should occur.
In accordance with this hypothesis, Gordijn and Stapel [21]
demonstrated an in-group/out-group effect on the direction of
priming. In their study, an intergroup context was made salient by
telling participants, who were students at the University of
Groningen, that their findings would be compared with the
findings from students at the University of Amsterdam. Then, for
the priming procedure, they were asked to form an impression and
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rate on several personality traits a person who was described as
either highly intelligent or unintelligent. Also, to manipulate the
social identity of the comparison target, the target person was
described as either a former student from the University of
Groningen (i.e., in-group) or from the University of Amsterdam
(i.e., out-group). Subsequently, participants were given a purport-
edly unrelated general knowledge test. In line with Gordijn and
Stapel’s prediction, priming with in-group comparison targets led
to behavioural assimilation (i.e., enhanced performance with the
intelligent target and poorer performance with the unintelligent
target) while out-group comparison targets led to behavioural
contrast (i.e., poorer performance with the intelligent target and
enhanced performance with the unintelligent target). This implies
that the social identity (in-group vs. out-group) of a comparison
target can moderate the direction of automatic behaviour.
In a further effort to obtain an intelligence priming effect, we
attempted to replicate Gordijn and Stapel’s study. Their article
[21] was retracted after the completion of Experiment 7 and hence
their data can be given no evidential weight. Nevertheless, the
hypothesis they put forward is a reasonable one and thus we report
Experiment 7 in relation to that hypothesis. Note that another
report on intelligence priming has also recently been retracted
[25]. An intergroup context was made salient by informing
participants (students from University College London [UCL])
that their results would be compared with the results of students
from Birmingham University, where the same experiment was
being run. The priming manipulation involved asking participants
to form an impression of a person who was described as either a
professor or soccer hooligan and who was either a former student
from UCL or from Birmingham University. Thus assimilation to
the comparison target is expected when the target is categorized as
an in-group member, whereas contrast should occur when the
target is perceived as an out-group member.
Methods
The experiment had a 262 design with intelligence of the target
(professor vs. hooligan) crossed with social identity (i.e., in-group
vs. out-group). The procedure closely followed that of Gordijn and
Stapel’s Experiment 2 [21]. A slight modification was made to the
intelligence manipulation: the comparison target was either
described as a professor or a soccer hooligan instead of being
described as a highly intelligent or unintelligent person. In
addition, a post-experiment questionnaire was employed to assess
awareness of the link between the priming manipulation and the
general knowledge test. For full details see the Supporting
Information.
Results
We conducted a 262 ANOVA on the percentage of correct
answers with target intelligence (professor vs. hooligan) and social
identity (in-group vs. out-group) as the between-subjects factors to
determine whether the priming manipulation affected perfor-
mance in the general knowledge test. There was no main effect of
intelligence, F(1, 44) = 0.08, p= .78, or identity, F(1, 44) = 0.38,
p= .54, nor, crucially, an interaction, F(1, 44) = 0.03, p= .87.
Means are reported in Table 1. Simple effects analysis revealed no
significant effect in either the in-group condition, t(22) = 0.30,
p= .38, where forming an impression of the professor comparison
target was expected to boost performance in the general
knowledge test compared to the soccer hooligan target, or the
out-group condition, t(22) =20.08, p= .47, where forming an
impression of the professor target was expected to impair
performance. Once again, we found no effect of the priming
manipulation on general knowledge test performance.
Experiment 8
In light of these failures to detect any reliable priming effects,
Experiment 8 aimed to explore whether it is possible to affect
general knowledge test performance by a different manipulation,
monetary incentives. It is well known that incentives and rewards
can motivate subjects to participate in experiments in a more
effortful and considered fashion and to improve their performance
against some standard [26]. In a meta-analysis of published
studies, incentives were found to have a medium-sized effect on IQ
performance [27] and effects of incentives on a range of measures
of educational performance in classroom settings have been
reported [28]. Thus, incentives may motivate participants to
employ more cognitive effort in a general knowledge task. The
present experiment therefore tests the hypothesis that if intelli-
gence priming can improve general knowledge ability through
increased motivation, then so too should explicit reward.
The experiment included 4 groups. Two of these performed the
general knowledge test under incentives or no incentives with no
priming phase. Two further groups performed the test after the
standard positive (professor) or negative (hooligan) priming induction
in a further attempt to replicate the basic intelligence priming
effect.
Methods
Participants were given a general knowledge test similar to those
of previous experiments. For participants in the incentive
condition, an initial endowment of 50 pence was allocated and
an extra 20 pence was earned for every question answered
correctly. Participants in the no-incentive condition were asked to
solve the general knowledge test with no monetary reward except
for the initial 50 pence payment. In the incentive and no incentive
groups we also recorded the time participants spent on each
question.
Results
Performance in the general knowledge test differed significantly
between the incentive and no-incentive conditions, t(38) = 2.00,
p= .026, d=0.63, but not between the professor and hooligan
conditions, t(38) = 1.20, p= .12, d=0.38 (see Table 1), although the
priming effect was in the right direction. Participants spent
marginally longer answering each question in the incentive than in
the no incentive condition: the mean of the median response times
was 9.01 sec in the no incentive condition and 10.7 sec in the
incentive condition, t(38) = 1.59, p= .06, d=0.50. Thus an overt
motivator such as monetary incentive can reliably influence
performance on the sort of general knowledge test employed in the
standard intelligence priming procedure, and the results confirm
that with our general methods and participant population it is
possible to observe reliable changes in general knowledge
performance. However, once again no effect of the professor/
hooligan prime was obtained.
Experiment 9
Yet another variation on the basic intelligence priming effect
was reported by Bry, Follenfant, and Meyer [20]. These
researchers considered the moderating influence of self-construal
on contrast and assimilation. ‘Self-construal’ refers to the way in
which the self is mentally represented and can vary from
independence, when the individual thinks of herself as unique,
autonomous, and distinct from others, to interdependent, when
she conceptualizes herself as connected to others and part of a
larger group. Bry et al. proposed that assimilation to an intelligent
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or unintelligent prime would occur under interdependence and
that contrast would occur under independence, and obtained
experimental support for this pattern.
To test this hypothesis, participants in Bry et al.’s Study 2 [20]
initially rated themselves in relation to a series of statements
designed to evoke independence (e.g., ‘‘I am unique – different
from others in many respects’’) or interdependence (e.g., ‘‘to
understand who I am, you must see me with members of my
group’’). This was followed by a priming phase in which
participants answered questions about a series of faces. Bry et al.
activated the ‘dumb blonde’ stereotype by including a large
proportion of faces of blonde-haired females. Finally, participants
answered general knowledge questions. Bry et al. found reliable
assimilation (worse performance after priming the stereotype
Blonde than after no priming) under the interdependent self-
construal and contrast (better performance after priming the
Blonde stereotype than after no priming) under independence.
We closely replicated Bry et al.’s procedure [20], but used the
professor/soccer hooligan stereotypes as well as a no-prime control
condition. Specifically, participants in the primed groups answered
questions about pictures of professors or soccer hooligans. For full
details see the Supporting Information.
Results
Bry et al. [20] only obtained a priming effect on a subset of
moderately difficult questions in their general knowledge task. The
percentage of correct answers in their study for these questions was
approximately 40%. Hence, we selected test questions which on
average showed a similar level of correct answers. In our
preliminary analysis, we estimated the mean of correct responses
of each of the twenty questions and ranked them into 4 groups of 5
questions according to their difficulty. Our analysis revealed that
the most difficult questions on our questionnaire were answered
correctly at a level similar (47% correct) to those in Bry et al.’s [20]
analysis.
A 2 (self-construal: independence vs. interdependence)63
(professor prime, hooligan prime, no prime) ANOVA was
performed on data from these difficult questions (see Table 1).
The analysis revealed no main effect of self-construal, F(1,
60) = 0.09, p= . 77, or of prime, F(2, 60) = 0.07, p= .94. The
interaction was also not significant, F(2, 60) = 1.23, p= .30. Indeed
the means for the professor and hooligan prime conditions were in
the opposite direction to those observed by Bry and colleagues.
Simple effects analysis revealed no significant effect in either the
interdependent self-construal condition, t(22) =20.68, p= .25,
where forming an impression of the professor comparison target
was expected to boost performance in the general knowledge test
compared to the soccer hooligan target, or the independent
condition, t(18) =20.18, p= .43, where forming an impression of
the professor target was expected to impair performance. Note
that the standard deviations reported in Table 1 are much larger
(though in line with those reported by Bry et al.) than in previous
experiments as a result of the small number of questions analysed.
The same pattern of nonsignificant results was obtained, however,
when we analysed all 20 questions in the test.
Bayesian Comparison of the Null and
Experimental Hypotheses
As noted earlier, traditional statistical methodology regards
failures to reject the null hypothesis as inconclusive. Indeed, in
Fisherian statistics ‘‘every experiment may be said to exist only in
order to give the facts a chance of disproving the null hypothesis’’
([29], p. 19). The null hypothesis significance testing approach has
been severely criticized, however, because it invites a number of
fallacious inferences, such as that rejection of the null hypothesis is
equivalent to affirmation of the experimental hypothesis, that p-
values provide measures of evidential support, and that they
represent the probability that the null hypothesis is true [30]. In
response to these concerns, Bayesian approaches have been
developed which regard the experimental and null hypotheses as
on an identical footing in terms of their ability to be evidentially
supported or disconfirmed and which, of particular importance,
allow one to evaluate evidence for the null hypothesis from a given
experiment or set of experiments [11], [17]. See [31] for a recent
application of these methods in another domain where uncon-
scious influences have been hypothesized.
We used the method described in [11] to compute a Bayes
factor for each experiment, defined as the ratio of the probability
of the data given the null hypothesis to the probability of the data
given the experimental hypothesis. To compute these factors, it is
necessary to specify the form of the distribution of possible effect
sizes under the experimental hypothesis. Two candidates are the
normal and Cauchy distributions. The Cauchy prior makes
weaker assumptions about the likely effect sizes under the
experimental hypothesis and is therefore preferred, although we
report results based on both. Although the experiments were
conducted for the purpose of testing directional hypotheses, we
report two-tailed Bayes factors because – as the reports of
assimilation and contrast indicate – an effect in either direction
could be interpreted as evidence of priming.
The Bayes factor for a given experiment, when multiplied by
the prior odds, yields the posterior likelihood ratio of the null
versus the experimental hypothesis, given the data. It is important
to note that the interpretation of a given Bayes factor is
independent of one’s predispositions regarding the ex ante
probability of the experimental hypothesis being true. Suppose a
researcher is strongly predisposed to believe that intelligence can
be primed in the situations studied here; perhaps her belief is that
the experimental hypothesis is 10 times more likely than the null
hypothesis (odds null:experimental of 1:10, equivalent to a
probability of p= .91 of the experimental hypothesis being true).
After observing data from an experiment which yields a Bayes
factor of 2:1, this researcher should rationally adjust her odds to be
2:10 ( = 1:5). Consider in contrast another researcher who is
strongly predisposed to doubt that intelligence can be primed; let
us imagine that he believes that the experimental hypothesis is 10
times less likely than the null hypothesis (odds null:experimental of
10:1, equivalent to a probability of p= .09 of the experimental
hypothesis being true). After observing the same data from an
experiment with a Bayes factor of 2:1, this researcher should adjust
his odds to be 20:1. In both cases the posterior odds have changed
by the same factor of 2:1.
Table 2 presents the effect sizes, t and p-values, and Bayes
factors for each relevant comparison. We treat the in-group and
out-group contrasts in Experiment 7 as if they were independent
experiments, and similarly for the independent and interdepen-
dent contrasts in Experiment 9 (where in addition we ignore the no
prime groups). The table shows that for each experiment, the null
gains at least twice as much support as the experimental
hypothesis, and for 6 of the contrasts (Cauchy) the Bayes factor
is greater than 3. A Bayes factor of between 1:1 and 3:1 is taken to
provide ‘anecdotal’ evidence in favour of the null, whereas factors
of between 3:1 and 10:1 provide ‘substantial’ support [32]. A
meta-analysis across all experiments (with the data z-transformed
within each experiment) yields a Bayes factor of 12.1, representing
strong support for the null.
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Discussion
We investigated here the claim that priming the concept of
intelligence can influence behaviour. This claim is important not
only because of its theoretical implications [4] but also because of
the possibility that performance in significant applied settings, such
as taking classroom exams, can be boosted by unconscious priming
[33]. However the results reported here suggest that priming the
concept ‘Professor’ (versus ‘Soccer hooligan’) confers no advantage
in answering general knowledge questions. Activating the concept
or goal of intelligence via priming a related concept does not
appear to increase intelligence in these experimental conditions.
The Bayesian analysis reported here suggests that considerable
confidence can be placed in this null hypothesis.
Why might we have obtained results so different from previous
published findings? One possibility is that our priming manipu-
lations were simply ineffective. This however seems unlikely. The
stereotypes (professor/soccer hooligan) are well entrenched in the
minds of our participant population, and we closely followed the
original protocols in the published studies. It is noteworthy that the
types of priming manipulation reported previously to be successful
have varied quite widely in their format; for example, while
Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg’s participants [3] considered
the attributes of the prime target for several minutes, LeBoeuf and
Estes [22] observed a priming effect with the standard attribute-
listing methodology when participants merely listed 3 attributes,
which may have taken only a few seconds. Participants in Bry et
al.’s study [20] simply reported the hair color of a series of
individuals shown in pictures. Thus studies reporting positive
priming effects have done so across wide variation in the priming
procedure.
A second possibility is that the knowledge tests we used were
different in some subtle but key way from those employed
elsewhere. Against this, however, is the fact that we modelled our
tests on those used previously (in Experiment 5, for instance, we
used many of the same questions that LeBoeuf and Estes had
employed) and we ensured similar levels of overall difficulty. In
addition we used a wide range of test questions, including non-
overlapping tests across our experiments, as well as different forms
of assessment (Raven’s matrices). Moreover we were able to affect
performance via monetary incentives (Experiment 8). Thus the
general knowledge test was not entirely insensitive.
A third possibility is that previous studies have yielded priming
effects because compliant participants were able to infer, and
hence behave in accordance with, the experimenter’s hypothesis
[24]. Although such a possibility would undermine the theoretical
significance of the effect, it would nonetheless imply that it should
be replicable. Perhaps for some reason our participants did not
respond in this way to the task demands. Our early failures to
obtain intelligence priming encouraged us to take this explanation
seriously, especially in light of other recent evidence: in another
priming situation, it was reported that participants judged a hill as
steeper when they were wearing a heavy backpack [2], but a later
study found evidence that this is an artefact of compliance by
participants to the perceived experimental hypothesis [34]. The
results of Experiment 6, however, provide little support for this
possibility within the intelligence priming task. An explicit
instruction as to the nature of the experimental hypothesis failed
to yield priming. Nevertheless, subtle differences between the
present experiments and previous ones may have affected
participants’ detection of and compliance with task demands.
The method employed in Experiment 6 to induce compliance may
have been inadequate, and the failure to induce priming in that
experiment does not categorically rule out the possibility that
participants in previous demonstrations of intelligence priming
were reacting to the perceived task demands. Future research
could profitably explore alternative methods to vary compliance
levels.
A fourth possibility is that our experiments lacked sufficient
power to detect small but real intelligence priming effects. The
Bayesian analysis reported above takes sample sizes into account
and hence its conclusion indirectly reflects experimental power: for
a given t-statistic, the Bayes factor increases with sample size.
Conventional power analysis therefore becomes redundant, but we
comment briefly on power nonetheless. Published effects have
been uniformly large to very large in terms of effect size. Effect
sizes in the original experiments reported by Dijksterhuis and van
Knippenberg [3] ranged from 0.83 to 1.35. In Dijksterhuis and
van Knippenberg’s [14] Experiment 2 the effect size (Cohen’s d)
was 2.11, in Hansen and Wa¨nke’s [16] Experiment 2 d=0.76, and
in Nussinson et al.’s [19] Study 3 d=0.84. In LeBoeuf and Estes’
[22] Experiment 2 the comparison between scores in the self-
professor similarities and self-Einstein differences groups had
d=0.72. In Bry et al.’s [20] Study 2, the priming effect size for the
independent self-construal was d=0.88 and for the interdependent
self-construal was d=0.79. These are strikingly large effects (mean
d=1.05, median= 0.86). Naturally, some of the individual
experiments or comparisons reported here had low to moderate
power. However, Experiment 4 was specifically conducted to
provide a near-exact replication of the published method with a
large sample size (larger than used in any of the published studies),
and that experiment alone had ample power to detect effects of the
magnitude noted above: it had power of 1 - b= .99 to detect a
large effect (i.e., d=0.8) and power of .80 to detect a medium-sized
effect (i.e., d=0.5). Across all the relevant comparisons (Experi-
ments 1–5 and 8, the in-group/out-group contrasts in Experiment
7, and the independent/interdependent self-construal contrasts in
Experiment 9), the cumulative b (i.e., the probability of all
comparisons failing to detect a true large effect, d= .8, one-tailed)
is approximately p=1027. The equivalent value for failing to
detect a true medium effect (d= .5) is p= .002. Hence whatever the
reason for our failure to obtain priming effects, low power does not
seem a plausible explanation.
Are the published effects false positives?
The evidence marshalled above against these four hypotheses
suggests that they fail to provide a compelling explanation of the
difference in the outcomes of the previous studies and those
reported here. A fifth and final possibility is that some or all of the
published results on intelligence priming were false positives. Is this
a more plausible explanation? One notable feature of the
published studies is the number of experiments whose results are
statistically nonsignificant at the conventional p= .05 level. For
example, in Dijksterhuis et al.’s [18] Study 1, described previously,
there were four different primes: the stereotypes professors and
supermodels, and the exemplars Albert Einstein and Claudia
Schiffer. Although there was a reliable difference in general
knowledge test scores between groups primed with the exemplars,
the difference between groups primed with professors and
supermodels was not significant. Rather than interpreting this as
a failure to replicate the basic intelligence priming effect,
Dijksterhuis et al. [18] noted that the effect was in the expected
direction and concluded that stereotype priming can indeed
influence test scores. Similarly, Schubert and Ha¨fner [23] obtained
a nonsignificant difference between groups expected to show the
standard assimilation effect, but again did not interpret this as
casting doubt on the existence of intelligence priming. We have
described in detail one of Gordijn and Stapel’s [21] studies
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(Experiment 2), but in another one (their Experiment 1) the
behavioural assimilation effect under an intergroup focus was
nonsignificant. It is noteworthy that another experiment by
Dijksterhuis et al. [18] (Study 2) failed to replicate Bargh et al.’s
[1] finding that priming the stereotype of elderly people can affect
walking speed. On the grounds that the effect was in the expected
direction, Dijksterhuis et al. again interpreted their data as
supporting the experimental hypothesis.
In each of these cases the hypothesis was that priming would
induce a change in test scores, but the nonsignificant results
obtained were not taken as evidence against that hypothesis.
Rather, because the effect was numerically in the expected
direction in each case, they were taken as supportive evidence,
consistent with confirmation bias [35].
Another bias which may contribute to the publication of false
positive effects is the employment of what have been labelled
‘researcher degrees of freedom’, the post hoc selection of data or
analysis methods [36]. If the researcher distributes many
questionnaires to participants in a session, for example, but only
publishes the findings from a subset of the questionnaires (the ones
which yield significant effects), then the true p value is likely to be
considerably larger than .05 and the reported results are more
likely to be false positives. One way to guard against this is to
distinguish between exploratory studies on the one hand which are
undertaken to explore a novel hypothesis, and confirmatory ones
on the other hand which are undertaken solely with the purpose of
replicating the findings of exploratory studies. Ideally, the details of
planned confirmatory studies should be decided beforehand (and
perhaps even made public) to completely eliminate the possibility
of unintentional use of researcher degrees of freedom [37].
Is there any evidence of post hoc selection of data or analysis
methods in the intelligence priming studies under consideration
here? Recall that Bry et al. ([20], Study 2) reported evidence of
assimilation under the interdependent self-construal and contrast
under the independence self-construal (although Experiment 9
failed to replicate this pattern). As noted previously, the interaction
reported by Bry et al. [20] pertained to moderately difficult
questions, and not to difficult ones. For difficult questions, there
was no interaction in the data. It is instructive to consider a recent
replication of this study which Bry and colleagues reported [38].
Bry et al. [38] again obtained this pattern, namely of an
interaction between prime and construal. However, the reported
interaction was significant for difficult questions and not for
moderately difficult ones, exactly the opposite to what was
reported by Bry et al. [20]. This pattern, at the very least, is
suggestive of inflation in the false positive rate as a result of ex post
selection of the data to be analyzed.
It is important to emphasize that false positives could arise
entirely from unintentional practices on the part of the researcher.
As an illustration [39], imagine that an experimenter runs a series
of experiments but makes errors in some of his statistical analyses,
something which has been shown to occur in a surprisingly high
proportion of research reports in psychology [40]. If the researcher
checks his analyses more carefully when an unexpected null result
is obtained than when an expected positive result is obtained, then
the false positive rate will be inflated. An analytic error in a false
null result is more likely to be detected than one in a false positive
result.
False positives can also arise, of course, because of intentional
malpractice by researchers. The retraction of two papers on
intelligence priming [21], [25] means that the findings reported in
those studies must be treated as false positives.
A final form of biased research practice is publication bias.
There has been renewed debate recently around the possibility
that the research environment in experimental psychology may
unintentionally lead to inflation in the reporting of false positives.
Several factors have been identified as possible contributors to
such inflation, most notably the file-drawer problem, whereby
failed replications are less likely to be published than successful
ones [39], [41], [42], a problem which appears to be getting worse
[43], and the increased prevalence of short-format journal articles,
which tend to include small numbers of studies or studies with
small sample sizes [44]. We cannot know how many failed
replications of the basic intelligence priming effect might exist in
researchers’ file drawers, but the PsychFileDrawer.org website
includes details of two failed replications [45], [46] and notes that
one of these studies was conducted in 2001, although it was not
made publicly available until 2012. Thus we have evidence that
for a decade, there existed at least some degree of bias in the
published literature on intelligence priming.
It was noted earlier that the reported effect size for the
intelligence priming effect across published studies is surprisingly
large (d<1). There are two points to make about this. First, it
implies that what is supposed to be a subtle effect is in fact larger
than many standard effects in cognitive psychology (and it also
makes the present failure to replicate the effect more puzzling as a
large effect should be more immune to minor procedural
variations). To put this in perspective, a meta-analysis of studies
of stereotype threat estimated a mean effect size of 0.26 [47].
Secondly, it is not open to a defender of intelligence priming to
claim that the true effect is notably smaller and that the published
studies have, merely by chance, obtained larger effects. The reason
this position is untenable is that if the true effect is real but smaller
(say, d=0.2), then the published literature must indicate publica-
tion bias. Given the moderate power of the published experiments,
the number of experiments which successfully obtained the effect
should have been very small (only 1 or 2), even if intelligence
priming is a true effect [39]. The fact that the majority of
published studies reported an effect could in that case imply only
one thing, namely that they are a biased sample and that
numerous failures to obtain the effect have, for whatever reason,
not been published.
Our suggestion that some or all of the published effects are false
positives might appear implausible given the sizable number of
published reports. Yet many of those reports have examined
interactive effects on intelligence priming such as the effects of self-
construal, category versus exemplar priming, and so on and did
not include control conditions replicating the basic priming effect.
How many independent experiments have reported a basic
priming effect of attribute listing (describing the characteristics of
a typical high-intelligence versus low-intelligence individual) on
general knowledge performance? Dijksterhuis and van Knippen-
berg’s [3] initial report included 4 experiments and their later
report ([14], Experiment 2) added a further replication. Nussinson
et al. ([19], Study 3) reported a significant difference between
groups primed with professors versus soccer players and in Hansen
and Wa¨nke’s ([16], Experiment 2) replication the primes were
professors and cleaning ladies. In contrast, Dijksterhuis et al. ([18],
Study 1) obtained a nonsignificant difference between groups
primed with professors and supermodels. Thus successful intelli-
gence priming effects using the basic procedure have been
obtained in 7 experiments reported in only 4 articles from 3
research groups across a period of 14 years. A total of 6
experiments (Experiments 3, 4, and 8 from the present series,
Dijksterhuis et al.’s Study 1 [18], and [45], [46]) have failed to
obtain the effect with the basic procedure.
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Conclusion
We do not deny outright the possibility of unconscious
influences on behavior, and obviously the present experiments
only relate to one particular type of priming and one particular
behavior. However the present results are consistent with many
other examples where claims of unconscious influences have not
withstood subsequent scrutiny: for a small sample of relevant
instances, see [31], [48], [49], [50], and for a comprehensive
recent review see [51]. It is never possible to recreate exactly the
conditions of previous experiments but if intelligence priming
effects are as important as some claim them to be (and as large),
then they ought to withstand minor variations in procedure,
otherwise we have little prospect of understanding their basis and
it is unclear why they should be afforded substantial theoretical
significance. From the perspective of the cognitive priming
literature, in which such effects tend to be very narrow and
context-specific, the absence of an effect in the present studies is
entirely unsurprising. Of course the typical procedures employed
in cognitive and social priming experiments are often very
different and they tend to focus on different forms of awareness
(awareness of the prime in the former case and awareness of the
influence of the prime in the latter case; see [51] for an extensive
discussion), but the convergence of findings is noteworthy. The
current results are also consistent with the view that conscious
thoughts are by far the primary driver of behavior [52] and that
unconscious influences – if they exist at all – have limited and
narrow effects.
The theoretical and practical implications of intelligence
priming are considerable. It is important that these elusive effects
are studied further in independent laboratories to try to determine
under what conditions they might be obtained.
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